

NOV 20 1959

Approved For Release 1999/09/17 : CIA-RDP75-00149R000100900004-1
CPYRGHT

Formula For China

The Senate Foreign Relations Committee should be giving the widest distribution to the report on Asian policy prepared for it under contract by Conlon Associates, Ltd., of San Francisco, a private research firm. This study contains specific and well-considered proposals for dealing with the problem of China that could form the basis for wide public discussion.

What the Conlon program would lead to is admission of Red China to the United Nations and diplomatic recognition by the United States, but these ends would not be achieved until certain conditions were met. Most of us would agree with Chairman Fulbright of the Foreign Relations committee, who observed in releasing the report: "While I do not believe that the United States should recognize Communist China at the present time in view of their continued belligerence and offensive manners, still I do not believe it is wise to continue to ignore the more than 600 million people on the China mainland in the naive belief that they will somehow go away."

The problem will not go away. It will become more acute and the American people should be considering what course they wish their government to pursue when action becomes desirable or imperative. The crisis may not come for years; but it could come quickly if there is another flare-up of the Quemoy-Matsu issue.

The Conlon study recommends itself for its reasonable and gradual approach to a permanent solution. In the first stage the United States would seek to test the position of Communist China and its interest in improving relations with this country. The views of America's allies also would be explored. In this stage the United States would make an offer for the mutual exchange of journalists, to be followed by proposals for exchanging students and businessmen. Then would come the dispatch of a prominent person or committee, not officially part of the Government, to conduct informal discussions with Communist leaders.

If all the components of the first stage were successful, the second stage would begin with abandonment of trade restrictions to the point of putting commerce with Red China on the same basis as that with the Soviet Union. Then would follow discussions with our allies and neutrals on a four-point program to include: admission of Red China to the U.N., recognition of Formosa as an independent country, seating of Formosa in the U.N. General Assembly, and the enlargement of the permanent membership of the U.N. Security Council (Nationalist China, Russia, Britain, France and the United States) to include India and Japan; Communist China would replace Nationalist China on the council.

While this program was under discussion there would be separate talks with Chiang on an agreement that would: underwrite the defense of Formosa, insure withdrawal of Nationalist troops from the offshore islands, and help resettle mainland refugees who wanted to leave. Then, "if feasible, the United States would negotiate a treaty of commerce with Communist China and, if successful, this would be followed by de facto recognition."

This is a variation of the "two-China" plan that is anathema to Chiang. The Communists, who regard Formosa as their property, will not like the proposal any better. But it is still the most practical plan that has been offered.

The report assails the argument that Red China should continue to be quarantined on moral grounds. It rightly holds that meaningful foreign policy cannot be conducted on the basis of moral judgments, and that it may be well to bring a government we consider immoral into the framework of an organization where more varied pressures can be exerted on it. This would happen if China was in the U.N., and it is a condition our government should seriously consider.

x Ag 2-1

FOIAb3b